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FOREWORD: CAUSES AND LIMITS OF PESSIMISM
STEPHEN B. BURBANKt

The David Berger Program on Complex Litigation has enabled
the University of Pennsylvania Law School to serve as a partner with
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of
the United States in bringing together talented judges, scholars, and
practicing lawyers to discuss the pressing procedural issues of the day.
This partnership resulted in a number of meetings devoted to the
state of practice under, and the possibilities for amending, Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, governing class actions. More
recently, the success of the format led the leaders of the federal judiciary's effort to reconsider the treatment of mass torts, Judges Anthony Scirica and Paul Niemeyer, to request that I organize a group to

t David Berger Professor for the Administration ofjustice, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
( 1851)
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help map the terrain for the Working Group on Mass Torts and, after
1
the Working Group issued its report, in assessing the prospects for
reform surveyed there.
This Symposium on Mass Torts represents part of that effort, and I
am grateful to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review for choosing it
as their annual faculty symposium and to the editors for their help in
making the arrangements and in shepherding the papers through the
editorial process. All of those involved owe a special debt of gratitude
to Ms. Rae DiBlasi, whose competent and cheerful help in this, as in
so much over a Penn Law career spanning more than forty years, ensured that complicated arrangements seemed simple and allowed the
participants to do their work efficiently and comfortably. A final word
of gratitude is reserved for David Berger, member of the Class of 1936.
Throughout an astonishing career at the bar, David has always remembered his alma mater and has always allowed the scholars his
funds have supported to go where their research took them.
As the readers of the contributions to this symposium will quickly
discover, not only is there no panacea for the problems created by
contemporary mass tort litigation, but there is widespread pessimism
among informed participants and observers about the ability of our
legal system to devise adequate solutions. I believe it is worthwhile to
consider briefly the sources of such pessimism, the causes of the distress that is evident in so many of the papers that follow. My hope is
that this exercise may help to identifY the limits of pessimism and
hence to be realistic about reform.
Consideration of the characteristically masterful paper by Professor Edward Cooper, which canvasses both a bold and a modest approach to the closure of mass tort claims by litigation or settlement,
should immediately remove from suspicion as the cause of pessimism
2
the lack of imagination, ingenuity, or insight. Rather, it appears from
Professor Richard Marcus's friendly but probing commentary that the
problems of mass tort litigation are polycentric, so that pressure ap3
plied in one area causes movement elsewhere, and that even a mod-

1

See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & WORKING GROUP ON MAsS TORTS,
REPORT ON MAss TORT LITIGATION (Feb. 15, 1999) [hereinafter REPORT ON MASS
TORT LITIGATION].
2
See Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Settlement of lvlass Torts, 148 U. PA. L. REv.
1943 (2000).
3
See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 394409 (1978) (suggesting various ways of adjudicating claims and solving problems characterized by a multiplicity of affected persons).
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est reform may yield a cure worse than the disease.
The other commentary on Professor Cooper's paper, authored by
Chief Judge Edward Becker and Jerome Marcus, reminds us that expertise comes in many forms and that solutions to the problems of
5
mass torts will require more than the best efforts of the bench. It is
no criticism of a group appointed by the Chief Justice of the United
States and working under the auspices of a committee of the Judicial
Conference that their work has focused on legal change within the
power of judges to effect. Indeed, one of the many useful products of
that work has been frank recognition of the limits of judicially fashioned change and the importance, therefore, of participation, if not
leadership, from the other branches of government. Professor Coo6
per's paper is largely devoted, after all, to a statute. Still, it is fair
comment that even the brightest group of judges and scholars of procedure may not have background in, or knowledge of, the relevant
7
substantive law to devise the best solution for legislative adoption.
Nearly fifteen years have passed since the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit openly acknowledged that, in the absence of help from Congress, the federal judiciary would be forced to
8
stop doing business as usual in asbestos litigation. Five years after
that, the call for both a congressional solution and, in its absence, for
more daring judicial efforts came from a special committee appointed
9
by the Judicial Conference. Congress chose to devote its efforts to
4

Marcus, Benign Neglect Reconsidered, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 2009 (2000).
Becker & Jerome M. Marcus, A Response to Professor Cooper, 148 U.
PA. L. REv. 2001 (2000).
6
See Cooper, supra note 2, at 1953-57.
7
Participants in this Symposium had the benefit of a long and thoughtful paper by
Professor David Rosenberg, who could not attend but who offered a very different approach. See David Rosenberg, Mass Production Goods, Torts andJustice (unpublished
manuscript, copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). Other substantive solutions are sketched in these pages by Professor Hazard and by Professor Mullenix. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Futures Problem, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1901, 1915-18
(2000); Linda S. Mullenix, Back to the Futures: Privatizing Future Claims Resolution, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1919, 1928-30 (2000).
8
"If Congress leaves us to our own devices, we may be forced to abandon repetitive
hearings and arguments for each claimant's attorney to the extent enjoyed by the profession in the past." Jenkins v. Raymark, 782 F. 2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986).
9
See REPORT ON MAss TORT LITIGATION, supra note 1, app. Cat 24 (noting that the
Ad Hoc Committee called for legislative authorization for class action trials to override
the limitations of Rule 23); Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation 27-35, 36-39 (Mar. 14,
1991) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (recommending consideration of a national legislative solution and urging the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules to end its informal moratorium on revisions to Rule 23).
5

See Richard L.
See Edward R.
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seemingly more tractable and in any event politically profitable areas
10
of litigation. The judiciary did entertain daring solutions in asbestos
litigation, but they foundered on limits found in existing law, inter11
preted in the shadow of the Constitution. And the Chief Justice la12
ments.
Perhaps we should conclude from this history that what Professor
13
Richard Marcus calls "benign neglect" is not only (in light of the alternatives) the best strategy but also the only feasible course. Perhaps,
that is, our pessimism should reflect not only the difficulty of moving
Congress to action, but, as Professor Geoffrey Hazard's bleak analysis
14
of the so-called "futures problem" suggests, the barriers that the Su5
preme Court's recent class action decisions have erected and those
that even Congress would confront in trying to resolve the futures
problem. Yet, before descending to those depths of despair, one
should consider the more optimistic view of class actions taken by
16
Judge Diane Wood and also by Professor Linda Mullenix/' as well as
the more optimistic views of specialists in bankruptcy, Professor Alan
18
Resnick, and Professor Elizabeth Gibson (whose commentary seems
19
to chart a course between Resnick and Hazard) .
Professor Resnick's and Professor Gibson's contributions may also
suggest a strategy of incremental legislative change that, when coupled with a similar strategy of judicially fashioned reforms, might yield
some relief, if not a global solution. In any event, they have deepened
my doubts about the wisdom and propriety of using Rule 23(b) (1) (B)
certification instead of bankruptcy to achieve "global peace" and
strengthened my belief that if Congress we re to amend the bankruptcy laws as suggested, the shadow of constitutional doubt that

10

See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.

737.
11

See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
12
See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2324 ("But the 'elephantine mass of asbestos cases,' ...
cries out for a legislative solution.") (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
13
Marcus, supra note 4, at 2009.
14
See Hazard, supra note 7.
15
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
16
See Diane P. Wood, Commentary on "The Futures Problern" by Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 1933, 1937-39 (2000) .
17
See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 1920-22.
18
See Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy As a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening, 148
U. PA. L. REv. 2045, 2049 (2000).
19
SeeS. Elizabeth Gibson, A Response to Professor Resnick: Will This Vehicle Pass Inspection?, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 2095, 2116-17(2000).
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darkens Professor Hazard's paper would dissolve in the bright light of
20
a democratic response to urgent practical problems.
Even a strategy of incremental judicial reform faces serious practical, political, and legal roadblocks. Professor Francis McGovern describes examples of cooperation in mass tort litigation within the federal judiciary and between the federal and state judiciaries, and he
21
sketches a model of enhanced cooperation. Chief Justice Norman
Veasey's commentary gives some hope of an invigorated state judicial
22
response and participation, but the problems of funding and coordination are surely daunting. Part of McGovern's plan calls for elabo23
ration of the relevant sections of the Manual for Complex Litigation.
Yet, Thomas Willging's interesting paper exposes the pitfalls of pre24
scription in that influential but not authoritative publication.
Apart from practical and prudential limits to what discretionary
judicial action can accomplish in this area, formal lawmaking by the
judiciary quickly confronts either the limitations in the Rules Enabling
25
Act or the need for statutory amendments. When the Supreme
Court has acknowledged what everyone knew-that the 1966 amend26
ments to Rule 23 had important substantive consequences -it becomes very difficult to make further amendments that implicate the
availability of the class device without the active involvement of Congress.27 In the present climate, it is also very difficult to see how to en20

See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action in American Securities Regulation, 113

ZEITSCHRIIT FUR ZMLPROZEB INT'L (forthcoming 2000) ("[l]t may be that the peo-

ple's elected representatives can wage peace more broadly and more effectively than
can self-appointed representatives.").
21
See Francis McGovern, Toward a Cooperative Strategy for Federal and State judges in
Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1867, 1886-96 (2000).
22
See E. Norman Veasey, A Response to Professor McGovern, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1897
(2000).
23
SeeMcGovern, supranote21, at 1895.
24
See Thomas E. Willging, Beyond Maturity: Mass Tort Case Management in the Manual for Complex Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 2225 (2000).
25
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (1994) (prohibiting Court rules from modifying substantive rights). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U.
PA. L. REv. 1015 (1982).
26
"[T]his Court's rulemaking under the enabling Acts has been substantive and
political in the sense that the rules of procedure have important effects on the substantive rights of litigants." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989) (footnote
omitted).
27
See Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 13, 19 (1996) ("It may seem a paradox, but use of the Enabling Act process to
correct its own excesses, even unanticipated excesses, is fraught with real controversy."); cf Burbank, supra note 25, at 1155-57 (discussing the Court's authority to
amend Federal Rules that incorporate statutory provisions).
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gage Congress without sacrificing the value of political neutrality to
28
which judges and their helpers in the rulemaking process aspire. It
may be concerns of this sort that have led to the Chief Justice's apparent "benign neglect" in response to the Working Group on Mass
Torts' recommendations for further action, which contemplate formal
29
cooperation between the judicial and legislative branches.
A more likely explanation of what I take to be the Chief Justice's
pessimism has to do with other potential costs ofjudicial involvement
in the highly charged political environment of mass torts litigation.
30
Professor Judith Resnik advises us, as they say, to "follow the money."
She evidently believes that the judiciary could, if it were so inclined,
rein in the practicing bar, and she sees in that prospect opportunities
31
for progress in addition to the resolution of mass torts litigation.
Her paper is rich in insight and extremely useful in focusing attention
on incentives. However, I share the skepticism of Judge Patrick Higginbotham as to whether the benefits of the process she would impose
32
are worth the costs, and of Professor Nancy Moore as to whether the
legal system as a whole would be well served by the judicial role in
monitoring attorney-client relationships that Resnik's prescriptions
33
would require. More fundamentally, I share the view of A.A.S. Zuckerman that any attempt to reduce the expense of litigation can be defeated by the entrepreneurial ingenuity of the bar until such time as
reformers directly alter the mechanisms by which the bar is compen35
sated.34 In this country, of course, that would require legislation.

28

See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules To Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions:
An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
2067, 2067-87 (1989) (arguing that "political neutrality is a central value in rulemaking"). But see Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The
Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1935-36 (1989) (disputing Carrington's
notions of "neutrality" and of "political").
29
See REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 1, at 67-70.
30
See Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Subsidies, Fees, and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 2119 (2000).
31
See id. at Section V.D.
32
See Patrick E. Higginbotham, Thoughts About Professor Resnik's Paper, 148 U. PA. L.
REv. 2197,2204 (2000).
33
See Nancy J. Moore, Ethics Matters, Too: The Significance of Professional Regulation of
Attarney Fees and Costs in Mass Tort Litigation-A Response to judith Resnik, 148 U. PA. L.
REv. 2209, 2215-22 (2000).
3
' See A.A.S. Zuckerman, Lord Woolfs Access to Justice: Plus Ca Change . ... , 59 MOD.
L. REV. 773, 795-96 (1996) ("There is no alternative to a direct attack on the economic
incentives to complicate and protract the litigation process.") .
35
See Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Proceduml Change: Who, How, Why, and
When ?, 49 ALA. L. REv. 221, 239 (1997).
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"Following the money" in mass tort reform focuses attention on
the corrosive effect that money plays not just in legislative halls but in
the halls of justice where judges are elected. It is no wonder that the
36
Chief Justice recoils from cooperative lawmaking. Yet, considering
how unlikely is effective reform from Congress and how limited are
the reforms that can come from the judiciary, federal or state-considering, moreover, that continued neglect may not be benign-we
may need to redefine the reform landscape. Overruling Buckley v. Va37
leo's invalidation of campaign expenditure limitations could serve as
an immense boon to legal reform, permitting both legislators and
elected judges to put principle before principal and enabling the cooperation between Congress and an independent judiciary that the
fear of guilt by association now retards. Pessimism is a luxury we cannot afford.

36

Cf Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture ofjudicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REv.
315, 316 (1999) ("The message that courts are engaged in partisan politics denies the
possibility of the rule oflaw."); id. at 339 ("Some politicians and interest groups believe
or pretend that the similarities between judges and legislators run far deeper [than the
fact that both make law], and that the processes of government affectingjudges should
reflect that view of reality.").
37
424 U. S. l (1976) .

